THE GREAT CHRONICLE OF BUDDHAS
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conventional truth. When the intellectual takes a look at what has been named ‘man’ by the
perceptionist, he does so with an analytical mind and makes thirty-two portions of this
person, such as hair on the head, hair on the body, fingernails, toenails, etc. ‚Is hair on the
head called man?‛ ‚Is hair on the body called man?‛ The answers to these questions cannot
be in the affirmative. In the same way, when a similar question on each of the remaining
portions of the human body is asked, the answer will be no every time, If none of these
portions can be called ‘man’, the intellectual will say, ‚Well, there really does not exist
such a thing called man.‛
Conventional truth appears only when it is seen through perception; but when seen
through wisdom, it disappears; so also the Ultimate Truth, which appears when it is seen
through wisdom; when seen through perception, it disappears.
In this connection, what is particularly noteworthy is the fact that NibbÈna is an Ultimate
Truth. This Ultimate Truth is peace through cessation of all kinds of sorrow and suffering.
This peace can be discerned only when it is examined by means of sharp insight but not by
means of perception.
The Perceptionist's View
Nowadays, some people might like to ask: ‚Are there in NibbÈna palatial buildings? How
do those who have passed into NibbÈna enjoy there?‛ and so on. They ask such questions
because of their perception of NibbÈna
,
which as Ultimate Truth lies in the sphere of
wisdom.
To be sure, there are no palatial buildings in NibbÈna nor are there any individuals that
pass into NibbÈna. (Those, who have realized peace of NibbÈna with their attainment of
arahatship, are no longer subject to rebirth, and their minds and bodies cease to exist when
complete demise takes place in their final existence, like a great flame of fire become
extinct. Such a cessation is called passing into
parinibbÈna
. No living entity exists in
NibbÈna.)
‚If that were the case, such thing as NibbÈna would not exist‛, the perceptionist would
say, ‚It is, therefore, useless and unnecessary.‛ In order to encourage him, others would
assert: ‚NibbÈna is a place where beings are immortal, assuming special mental and
physical forms and enjoying incomparable luxury in palaces and mansions.‛ Then only is
the perceptionist satisfied immensely because the assertion agrees with what he has
preconceived.
If one looks through perception at something and sees the appearance of its concrete
form, that is not absolute (
paramattha
) but merely a conventional designation (
paÒÒatti
). So
also, if one looks through wisdom at something and sees the disappearance of its form, that
is not absolute either, but merely a conventional designation too. Only when one looks
through wisdom and sees its true nature, then this is absolute. The more one looks thus, the
more one sees such reality. Therefore, NibbÈna
,
which is just Peace, highly unique
Absoluteness, should not be sought through perception which tends to grasp form and
substance. Instead, it should be examined through wisdom which tends to remove form and
substance and delve into their true nature so that Peace, NibbÈna, manifests itself.
Conventional truth and ultimate truth are both acceptable, each in its own context, as has
been shown above. Suppose a person takes an oath saying: ‚I declare that there really exist
man and woman. If what I have declared is not correct let misfortune befall me‛, and
suppose another person also take an oath saying: ‚I declare that there really do not exist
man and woman. If what I have declared is not correct let misfortune befall me‛, never
will misfortune befall either of them. The reason is: though the two declarations are against
each other, both are correct from their respective points of view. The former, correct from
the point of view of conventional usage, is conventional truth; the latter, correct from the
point of view of ultimate sense, is ultimate truth.
Although Buddhas intend to teach only the nature of absolute reality, they do not exclude
the conventional terms from their teaching. Instead they mention them side by side with
those of ultimate truth. For instance, even in the First Sermon, though the emphasis is on